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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--

DAVID M. STAUFFER and CONNIE A.
STAUFFER,

Plaintiffs, Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO BRIEF FOR PETITION
ON REHEARING

vs

RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL
and SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION,
Defendants, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,

Case No. 15468

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiffs, Appellants and CrossRespondents STAUFFER,

(hereafter "STAUFFERS"), seeking

specific performance of a Utah Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and for partition.

Defendants, Respondents, Cross-Appellants

and Petitioners CALL and SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION,

(hereafter

"Defendants") seek to quiet title to the real property
concerned, and request an order of restitution.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the lower court on the sole
issue of whether a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated 2 January 1969 constituted a valid and enforceable
contract. Judgment was granted to Defendants, the lower
court ruling that the contract was void and of no effect as
a contract for the sale of real property, by reason of
insufficiency of the descriptions in the document.

Judgment

was also rendered in favor of DAVID and CONNIE STAUFFER in
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the amount of $9,228.00 as of 1 September 1977 , repr
esent.
monies paid by STAUFFERS on the contract.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of,
lower court, and ordered the case remanded to the lower
court, with directions to determine the descriptions of

ti'

property purchased by STAUFFERS, to order Defendants to
execute appropriate conveyances, and to conduct further
proceedings consistent with the reversal and remand.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendants apparently seek a rehearing, even though 1
Petition for Rehearing has been filed, hoping to get the
Supreme Court to reverse its elf.

STAUFFERS oppose the

granting of a rehearing, and seek inunediate remittitur

a:

the case to the lower court, for further proceedings in
accordance with the Supreme Court opinion filed 9 January
1979.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 2 January 19 69, school teacher DAVID M. STAUFFER a:;
his wife, seeking a Utah refuge for themselves and their
sixteen children, purchased lands from Defendants by way 0'
a Uniform Real Estate Contract (R259;P-17; T211:8-17). It.
wording of the descriptions involved was supplied by oefi:'.
RUSSELL CALL.

(Tl01:23-30; T25: 1-7).

The total purchase

price was $12, 000. 00, payable in two payments of $1,000J
each, the balance being payable at the rate of $100.00 pe:
month. STAUFFERS could accelerate payment of the amount a:'
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STAUFFERS, together with their flock, went into possession
of the property in April, 1969.
1

(Tl 7: 19-25; R259) .

They

ived there as a family except for two school years, and

always lived there during the summertime.
13).

(T220:22-30;T221:1-

I t was most likely the winters of 1971 and 1974 that

the family left the farm.

However, during the time STAUFFERS

were not physically in residence, they rented the property
to persons of their choice.

(T218: 18-23; T219: 22-30). The

two homes on the property were unfit for human habitation,
and STAUFFERS and their children renovated the homes for
living purposes.

Other substantial and significant improvements

were also made upon and to the property over a period of
years.

In general, STA OFFERS and their family did everything

that intelligent, progressive owners do to protect and
improve their property.

(T47 thru 50; R259-260).

Defendants

knew of the substantial improvements being made by STAUFFERS.
(R260).

So attached were STAUFFERS to their home that a son

was interred on the property, binding them even closer to
their chosen soil.

(Tll5: 1-2).

STAUFFERS faithfully made

the monthly payments required of them.

(R260).

On or about 22 September 1972, STAUFFERS tendered full
payment of the balance then due on their purchase contract,
and requested their deeds.
Defendants CALL.

(R3, R45).

Delivery of deeds was refused by
After attempts to obtain title

failed, this action was filed on 3 March 1973.
Defendants CALL thereafter, as had been their obvious
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intent since refusing to deliver deeds, sold the pro

Perty

second time to Defendant SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION for t:.c
price of $60,000.00, exactly 500% of the price of theoriq:
sale to STAUFFERS.

(T267: 1-30; T268: 1-11) .

At trial, the lower court found the contract unenforc,_
due to insufficiency of description, quieted title in Def::
and ordered all monies paid on the contract to be returnei
to STAUFFERS, with interest from dates of payment. ($25J264; R265-268).

At no time did Defendants ever

tend~

return of the money paid by STAUFFERS.
After trial and during appeal, Defendant SUNSET CANYc:,
CORPORATION has regularly caused the property to be adver::
and offered for sale as commercial development property,
a price of about $4, 000. 00 per acre.

0:

Some specific repres'·

made to the public about the value of the land are as foll:
1.

The property is "440 + acres on key interchange

leading to Zion Park.
2.

Prime highway commercial potential.

The property is the "investment opportunity of tf,,

season . . . . . . . on all 4 sides of the interchange ..... This
land is a syndicator's dream package!"
3.

"400 acres at this key interchange leading ~z~

National Park .•.... ready for its transformation to Highwi'
commercial.

Over 8000 cars per day during August.

l,OODi

plus visitors see Zion Park each year and are potent~l
customers .....•. Priced under $4,000.00 per acre."
(See Appendix, Affidavit of CONNIE A. STAUFFER).
Defendants' figures,

Using

the land is now worth about $1,
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600 Of

'

if the "400-acre" figure is used,
if the " 440 -ilC r ~s"
~

and about $1,760,000.00

fi'gure is used.

When STAUFFERS purchased in 1969, their interest constituted
one-half or more of the total ownership interest in the
property, worth $12,000.00, the conservative value of the
whole therefore being $24, 000. 00 or less.
On an acreage basis, the land in question was worth
$60.00 per acre if the 400-acre figure is used, and $54.54
per acre i f the 440-acres + is used.

With Defendants willing

to sell at about $4,000.00 per acre in the year 1978, the
value of each acre of land has increased between 6, 666. 67%
and 7,335.90%, depending on whether the high or low number
of acres is used. Actually, the land value of the property
may have risen as high as 12,574.66%.

See Affidavit of

Connie A. Stauffer.
Defendants have never filed a Petition for Rehearing.
See record on file.

A "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" has

been filed by Defendants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANY REQUEST OF DEFENDANTS FOR REHEARING
SHOULD BE DENIED FOR FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS
TO FILE AND SERVE A PETITION FOR REHEARING
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY LAW.
URCP 76(e) (1) states:
"Within 20 days after the filing of the decision
of the Suorerne Court, either party may petition
the Court for a rehearing.
The petition shall
~ briefly the points wherein it is alleged
tha~ !-h~ appellate court has erred.
The
petition shall be supported ~ ~ brief of
the authorities relied upon to sustain the
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points listed in such petition. Both th
petition and brief in support thereQI mu:t
be prepared in accordance with the requir
of Rule 75(p), and shall be served upon t~ent:
adverse party prior to filing.
(Emphasis :ddei
The record in this case shows that the decision of'.
Supreme Court was filed on or about 9 January 1979.

Def,.

upon reading the decision which went against them, deter:.

'

that they needed additional time to prepare and file a
petition for rehearing, and requested and were

grant~~

13 February 1979, in which to file a petition for rehear::.
See Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief and
Petition for Rehearing and Order, and Affidavit in suppo::
of Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief

a~

Petition for Rehearing, and URCP 76(f).
On 9 February 1979, Defendants apparently filed the::
Brief for Petition on Rehearing, and on the same day, no:
earlier, served copies upon counsel for STAUFFERS.

See

Brief for Petitioners. At no time has a petition for rer.eo:.
been served or filed by Defendants, who find themselves1:
the position of having a brief in support of a non-existc
pleading, the time for filing such pleading

having~~

passed.
URCP 76 (e)

clearly requires the timely filing and

service of both a petition for rehearing and a supporting
brief.

In this case, no petition for rehearing has been

filed or served by Defendants, and the court should n~
grant any rehearing, the prerequisites to such not h~~
been met.
In Enrique v. Grant,

5 Utah 400, 16 P. 595 (188 8I ' t ..
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arly determined that a petition for rehearing was a
cour t e
al. ng not an argument. The Court stated:
p1"il

1

"We call attention to the practice pursued in
this case on motion for rehearing. The petition
is an extended and elaborate argument in favor
of a rehearing.
This is not in conformity to
the rule.
The petition for rehearing is a
pleading, and should not be an argument.
If
points and authorities are submitted, it should
be in a separate instrument, and not as part of
the petition."
The rehearing requested in Enrique was denied.
In our neighboring states, it was early decided that a
late filing of a petition for rehearing would result in
denial of the same.

In Durgin v. McNally, 82 Cal. 595, 23

P. 375 (1890), the petition for rehearing arrived and was
filed one (1) day late.

It was denied as being untimely.

Wyoming early ruled that the rule requiring the filing of a
petition for rehearing within a certain time, had the force
of statutory law, and held that petitions filed after were
unavailing. Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 129
P. 1023, reh. den. 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881 (1913).
where the petition is mailed

~1ithin

Even

the time limit, but

arrives late for filing, a rehearing will be denied.
Whettlin v. Jones,

32 Wyo. 446, 236 P. 247, reh. den. 32

Wyo. 446, 234 P. 515 (1925).

Oregon has even held that

where a rule of the Supreme Court fix es a time within which
a petition for rehearing must be filed, the court has no
discretion to grant a rehearing.
Mining Co., v. Ruble,

Coyote

Gold and Silver

9 or. 121 (1881). Recent cases in

sister states have held that a one (1) day filing delay
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after extension of time,
Commission, 107 Ariz.

is too late, ~v Indu~tt~;._,

285,

-~

486 P.2d 183 (Ariz.,

1971); and that the time for filing a petition for

rehear;.

is not extended by the 3-day period ordinarily allowed for
service by mail by another rule, Garrett v Garrett, 30 Co:
App. 167, 505 P.2d 39

(Colo., 1971); all going to show th,

jurisdictional nature of timeliness where petitions for
rehearing are concerned.
Since no proper petition for rehearing has been filec,
no rehearing should be granted to Defendants.
POINT II
IF DEFENDANTS' "BRIEF FOR PETITION ON
REHEARING" IS CONSTRUED TO BE A "PETITION
FOR REHEARING", IT SHOULD BE DENIED FOR THE
REASON THAT IT IS NOT IN PROPER FORM, CONTAINS
ARGUMENT AND REARGUMENT, AND NO SUPPORTING BRIEF
HAS BEEN TIMELY FILED.
URCP 76 (e), of course, requires filing of both a pet:'..
for rehearing and a supporting brief on a timely basis.
Enrique, supra,
same.

the only Utah case on point, requires the

If Defendants urge that the Supreme court consider

their "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" as constituting a
petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court should not adopt
such contention, but if it is adopted, such petition shou;:
be denied for not being accompanied by a proper, supportinc
brief.
A petition for rehearing will not be considered int'.:
absence of an accompanying brief.
Wyo.

State v Sorenson, 34

9 0 , 2 41 P . 6 0 7 , re h . d en. 3 4 Wyo. 9 0 , 2 41 p . 705, ani

34 Wyo. 84, 241 P. 707

(1926).

305, 153 P. 27, reh. den.

In Tuttle v. Rohrer, 23 NY:

23 Wyo.

305, 149 P. 857 (19 151 ''
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. f

br1e

as tjmely filed, entitled "Petition for Rehearing".
w

The Wyoming supreme Court deemed it not in compliance with
applicable rules governing rehearings, and denied the rehearing.
In the instant case, we find either a brief unaccompanied by
a petition, or a petition unaccompanied by a brief.

We do

not find Defendants in compliance with the applicable rules.
rt is clear that the only document filed by Defendants
applicable to a claimed rehearing, consists of argument, and
of reargument of matters already heard by the Court.

A

petition containing argument and reargument should be stricken
or properly denied.

Washington Securities Co. v. Goodstein,

79 Colo. 343, 246 P. 278

(1926); Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co.,

78 Nev. 69, 369 P.2d 676; cert. den. 83 s.ct. 39, 371 U.S.
821 9 1.Ed. 2d 61

(1962); Gershenhorn v. Walter R. Shetz

Enterprises, 73 Nev. 293, 306 P.2d 121 (1957); In re Powell's
Estate, 62 Nev. 121, 144 P.2d 996 (1944); and Clark v. Jones,
62 Nev. 72, 141 P.2d 385 (1943).

As set out succinctly in Enrique, above, "The petition
for rehearing is a pleading, and should not be an argument."
Where a petition for rehearing does not comply with the
rules set, it wil 1 not be heard.

People ex rel. Dunbar

South Platte Water Conservancy District, 139 Colo. 503, 343
p. 2d 812

( 19 5 9) .

If the "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" is considered
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a petition for rehearing timely filed, the "petiti
argument, reargument, and is not accompanied by a

on 11 cor:
proper

supporting brief, and should therefore be denied.
POINT III
NO CONSIDERATION OF REHEARING SHOULD BE
GRANTED IN THE ABSENCE OF JUSTICE ELLETT.
Chief Justice ELLETT wrote the opinion of the Court.
this matter, with Justices CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, and HALL
concurring.

Since filing of the opinion, Chief Justke

ELLETT has retired.

The Court has previously taken the

position that where an opinion is rendered by the Court,
that opinion will not be set aside except by the vote of,
majority who heard the matter.

Shipper's Best Exp., Inc.

v. Newsome, 579 P.2d 1316 (Utah, 1978).
The instant case was heard and decided by Justices
ELLETT, CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, and HALL, with WILKINS dissentl:.
Since the retirement of Chief Justice ELLETT, only four
remain who heard the case.
If any consideration is to be given to Defendants'
request for rehearing, such consider a ti on should be given~
the five who decided the matter, particularly where the
writer of the opinion could be appointed as a Justice Pro
Tern for purposes of the hearing.

If not so appointed,

consideration of a request for rehearing by Defendants
should only be undertaken by the four remaining members of
the deciding Court.
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The preferred course, though, would be to have the
five who decided the case, decide any request for rehearing.
This procedure is authorized by UCA 49-7-5. 7 (1953, as
amended), which states in part:
"Any judge who has retired under the
provisions of this act and is physically
and mentally able to perform the duties
of the office and who is not engaged in
the practice of law shall be entitled
after retirement to serve from case
to case as a justice of the Supreme
Court upon invitation of the Chief
Justice. .
"
If the Court is going to consider this matter at
all, the Chief Justice should invite former Justice ELLETT
to again sit as Justice of the Supreme Court for
purposes of any such consideration, particularly where
Justice ELLETT is the author of the Court's decision
of 9 January 1979.
POINT IV
NO REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED, FOR THE REASON
THAT T,HE SUPREME COURT DID NOT TAKE OR NEED
TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE TO REACH ITS DECISION
IN THE OPINION DATED 9 JANUARY 1979, AND THE
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE COURT THAT LAND
VALUES INCREASED GREATLY IS AMPLY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD.
Defendants assert that the Court took "judicial notice"
of the great increase in land values in the area of the
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subject property since the contract of 2 January 1%g
made.

was

Whether "judicial knowledge" is the same thing

as "judicial notice" is questionable.

In any event,

the wording "This Court takes judicial knowledge of
the fact that land values in the area increased

great~

since the contract was made" found in the opinion is
dictum not required for the Court to reach its decision.
Further, the Court had actual, "judicial knowledge"
of the increase in land values in the area, and had
specific knowledge of the increase of the subject
property, because such facts are clearly set forth in
the record.

The original, arm's-length transaction

showed the land purchased by STAUFFERS to have a fair
market value of $12,000.00.

A while later, Defendanb

CALL sold their interest in the contract to
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION for $60,000.00!

Defenda~

Clearly, the

record gave the Court "judicial knowledge" of the gr9t
increase in the value of the land.
T268:1-30; T269:1-15).

(R259; P-17; T267:12·l~:

In view of the record, this

Court had and is charged with judicial knowledge of
the great increase in value of the land involved in
this matter, and properly so found.

Such being the

case, Defendants' clamor about "judicial notice" is
not pertinent.
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POINT V
IF THE SUPREME COURT DID TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE GREAT INCREASE IN VALUE OF THE LAND,
ANY REQUIREMENT OF A HEARING WOULD HAVE BEEN A
FUTILE ACT, AND ANY ERROR MERELY HARMLESS ERROR,
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE MADE NO
CLAIM OF BEING ABLE TO SHOW THAT THE VALUE OF
PROPERTY IN THE AREA HAS NOT INCREASED GREATLY
IN VALUE SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS MADE, AND PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF DEFENDANT SUNSET CANYON'S OWN
VALUATIONS SHOWING INCREASES BETWEEN 6,666%
and 7,340%, AND PERHAPS AS HIGH AS 12,574%
SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS MADE.
Defendants claim that the Court committed error
in taking "judicial notice" of the great increase in
the value of the land involved in this case.

While no

"judicial notice" was taken, even if it had been, Defendants'
arguments about error are without merit for the following
reasons:
1.

At no place in their "Brief for Petition on

Rehearing" do Defendants make any claim that a hearing
would result in any finding that the land did not greatly
increase in value since the contract was made.

Lacking

any such claim, a hearing would have been a futile act,
a waste of the time of the parties, their counsel, and
this Court.

Also, since the record shows the increase, the

increase was noticed, and URE 12 ( 4) , does not require a
hearing in such a case.

2.

Further, if a hearing had been required, it

would have resulted only in Defendants establishing that the
land h,:ir
0

1·

. value somewhere between 6,666% and
ncrease d in
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7,340%, with a possible increase of 12,574% , using their
own values as stated by DEXTER SNOW, President of

S~s~

CANYON CORPORATION, which values of about $4, 000. oo P
er 'c:.
were published to the world in the Color Country Spectr~-,
daily newspaper in Southern Utah, and the Washington Count
News, a weekly newspaper in the County in which the
is located.

pm~~

See Appendix, Affidavit of CONNIE A. STAUFFE?.

Admittedly, if a hearing were required, and if land value;
had not increased greatly since 1969, Defendants' rights
might have been harmed.

Where, however, no claim has bee:.

made by Defendants that the land has not increased great!;
in value I

and where SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION Is President,

DEXTER C. SNOW, values the land at about $4,000.00 per acr,
over the 1969 values of less than $60. 00 per acre, no allE:
error in failing to give notice pursuant to URE 12(4) coc::
have harmed Defendants in any way.
URCP 61 states:
"No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties,
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court
,
inconsistent with substantial justice. Thecooi
at every stage of the proceeding must di~regard_
any error or defect in the proceeding which doe'.
not affect the substantial rights of the partie:.
Here, where a hearing on the great increases in land
values would have served only to further silhouette and~:·
the great increases in the value of the land already showr.
tt r r· ·
upon the face of the record, Defendants are in a be e ··

-14-
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he one they would occupy had such a hearing been held,
than t
·
an d an_Y error in failing to hold such a hearing is mere
harmless and non-prejudicial error.
POINT VI
NO "DISHEVELMENT" OF THE RECORD OCCURRED,
AND THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD
OF REVIEW IN REACHING ITS DECISION.
Defendants apparently claim that the Court applied the
wrong standard of review and that the opinion in this case
was the result of the failure of then Chief Justice ELLETT,
and impliedly of the failure of Justices CROCKETT, MAUGHAN
and HALL, to read the trial transcript.

No evidence shows the

existence of any such failure or shows that the trail transcript
was not reviewed.

All files in the Clerk's office are available

at all times to all justices, and it is not required that any
part of a file be "checked out" when being reviewed by any
Justice.

It is the practice, however, for a Justice to

"check out" items he takes from the building, as when he takes
a part of a file home for evening study.

In fact, the

statement that Justice ELLETT checked out parts of the file,
clearly shows his detailed attention to the case.
Defendants have made no direct charge that Justices
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and HALL failed to read the record,

imply such failure.

but

No evidence exists to support such

implied charges, other than that in Defendants' wishful
thinking.

No charge, express or implied, has been made by

Defendants that any of the Justices on the majority failed to
read the "Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellants" which

-15-
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...
was before the Court on appeal.

A review of that d

OCllJncr·

clearly shows the fact of trial, and states facts in fa,,·
'•.

of Defendants much more favorably than the trial tra
its elf, as could be expected.

nscri:·

Therefore, even if the

Justices in the majority had failed to read the trial
transcript, such Justices were apprised of the facts

a~:

issues involved by Defendants' own brief on appeal.
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, requ::
that where equity is involved, this Court may review que::
of fact as well as questions of law, and indeed, has the'..
of examining questions of fact.

The Supreme Court can

ff.

the evidence, make its own findings, and substitute its;.
for that of the trial court when the ends of justice so
require.

Harding v. Harding, 26 U.2d 277, 488 P.2d 308

(1971).

To the extent that the majority opinion appears to
controvert the findings of the lower court, it is clear
that the Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, found in
favor of STAUFFERS on pertinent questions of fact, and tr. 0:
substituted its own judgment for that of the lower court,
is the privilege and duty of the Supreme Court in a prcpi:
case, the instant case.
Point II in Appellants' Brief, before the Court on a::
raises pertinent issues of fact for review by the s~nm
Court, when it refers to the boundary agreement and marb:
boundaries by Defendant CALL.
There is no evidence on any record before the court,

-16-
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that the court applied the standard of review used for
summary judgments, and Defendants' claim that such standard
was used by this Court has no foundation.
POINT VII
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IN THIS CASE
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE PLED BY STAUFFERS, WAS
TRIED BY CONSENT, WAS IMPLIEDLY RAISED BY
STAUFFERS ON APPEAL, AND, IF APPLIED BY THIS
COURT, WAS PROPERLY APPLIED.
STAUFFERS pleadings clearly show their claim to specific
performance.

It was the duty of Defendants to raise any

affirmative defenses to the same, and no further pleading of
STAUFFERS was required.

URCP 7{a) allows for a reply to an

answer, where the court specifically orders a reply .. In this
case, the lower court never did order any reply to Defendants'
answer.
The issue of part performance was raised and tried by
consent, even by stipulation, at the time of trial.

See

T43:19-24, where RONALD W. THOMPSON, associate counsel for
Defendants, stipulated STAUFFERS' possession, payments, and
improvements, and also see T42:21-30, T43 through T51, and
T47 through Tl26.

The only objections raised were relevancy

and materiality. Some of Mr. HUGHES' objections were granted;
some were denied; but the salient factors of possession,
payments, and substantial improvements by STAUFFERS were
admitted by Defendants.
Point II, Appellants' Brief, previously before the
Court, raises the issue of part performance where it claimed
error on the part of the trial court in failing to show
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cure of alleged ambiguities in the contract.

Defendants

have sought to make the Court believe that the "part per:
rule" is hard and fast, with no exceptions allowed,
not the case.

Such

Defendants have relied extensively for su~,

on Adams v. Manning, 46 U.82, 148 P.465 (1915).
these involved a certain receipt alleged to be

The site'
s~n~~

Adams of $30. 00 as part payment for thirty acres of land.
Nothing was said about the location of the land on the
larger parcel.

D. C. Adams was dead, and at the trial

level, no direct evidence of the terms and conditions of:
contract was shown, largely because of the "Dead Man

sw~

The alleged possession of Manning was tenuous, at best, a:.
in some doubt.

The Adams Court stated:

"As we view it, no hard and fast rule shouM
prevail in such cases, and the statute should
be given due effect, and, if a case is presente:
the inherent equities of which require specific
enforcement, it should be enforced without
hesitation, and if, upon the other hand, such
is not the case, specific enforcement shouM
be denied." (Emphasis added).
The Adams Court then went on to state:
"(R) espondent' s claims are entirely devoid
of equity." (Emphasis supplied) .
The Supreme Court refused specific performance in
Adams because the purchaser showed no equities at all in:.:
favor!

A close review of each and every subsequent case

cited by Defendants will show a refusal of this Court to
require specific performance only after the equities have
been weighed, and found wanting on the part of the person
seeking specific performance.
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>
In the instant case, the equities are overwhelmingly in
favor of S'l'J\UFFERS and their family.
They made substantial improvements.
resided upon the property.
property.

They went into possession.
They occupied and

They buried their dead upon the

They made all payments faithfully, as required by

their contract.

Defendants accepted STAUFFERS' money and

never offered to return it.

Land values rose precipitously.

only when struck by a bad case of "Sellers' Remorse" did
Defendants have any doubts about the lands STAUFFERS purchased.
Then Defendants CALL sold their interest in the contract to
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, which knowingly purchased this
lawsuit for $60,000.00, giving Defendants CALL a second
purchase price 500% of the original price.

Upon appeal of

the instant case, the Supreme Court followed its prior
positions, found the equities in favor of STAUFFERS, and
therefore reversed and remanded.
In Jacobsen v. Cox, 115 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 714 (1949),
this Court stated:
"People who reside in faraway rural communities
cannot be charged with unreasonable accuracy
in describing unsurveyed land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..... The original parties to the contract could
not have described the land by metes and bounds
without going to the expense of running a
survey."
The Jacobsen Court then stated, at 722:
"Conceding that the contract has some infirmities,
we deal with more than an oral contract. We have
a written instrument which is attacked because of
uncertainties and ambiguities. We are of the
opinion that Plaintiff, by his acts and conduct,
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q
is estopped from taking advantage of the
deficiencies.
To hold otherwise would~
the Statute of Frauds to be used as a sherrn it
.
le 1d
to defeat what appears to be a Just and
.
cause against him." (Emphasis added).
equlti:
In this action, the results flowing from the lower
court's decision "shock the conscience", and this Court.
determined by its decision that it will not permit thos:
results to stand and thus do inequity.

It has, in effec:.

estopped Defendants from taking advantage of any allege,
deficiencies in the contract, and rightly so. Therefore,
rehearing should be granted.
POINT VIII
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT NO REHEARING BE
GRANTED.
At 27 Am. Jur. 2d 516, "Equity", Section 1, we fini
in part:
"All great systems of jurisprudence have a
mitigating principle or set of principles, ~
the application of which substantial justke
may be attained in particular cases wherein tf.o
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law
seem to be inadequate.
From the point of vie1:
of general jurisprudence, "equity" is the narre
which is given to this feature or aspect of
law in general.
However, the term "equi~'
has a variety of meanings.
The word describes
a system of jurisprudence, and it is empl~~
to designate the principles or standards of
that sys tern.
Such a use of the work is illust:
by the maxim "equity regards as don~ tha~ w~
ought to be done. 11
In this connection, .1t ~
be observed that the court of chancery is . .
sometimes referred to as a court of 'consc1~
(Emphasis supplied) .
27 Am. Jur. 2d 518, "Equity", Section 2, states in
part:
"It has been s- id that one of the most saluter

-20-
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principles of chancery jurisdiction is that,
strictly speaking, it has no immutable rules.
It lights its own pathway, blazes its own trail,
aves its own highway; it is, in short, an
2appeal
to the conscience of the court."
(Emphasis supplied) .
This supreme Court, in the exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction, determined that it would be unfair to let the
decision of the lower court stand as rendered, and effectively
refused to recognize the mechanistic formulae propounded
~Defendants,

favoring instead, a balancing of equities

resulting in STAUFFERS' favor.
Having determined the equities to be in STAUFFERS'
favor, it would serve no good purpose now to grant a rehearing
to review once more the contentions of Defendants.

All

parties have "had their day" before this Honorable Court, and
the case should be remitted immediately to the trial court
for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of 9
January 1979.
POINT IX
EVEN IF THE FORMER LAW WERE AS STATED BY
DEFENDANTS, NO REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED
FOR THE REASON THAT THIS COURT, USING ITS
COMMON LAW POWERS, MADE NEW LAW, BINDING
IN THIS CASE AND IN THE FUTURE.
Defendants are seeking a rehearing before this Court
based upon claimed errors of law, among other things.

A

voluminous brief has been filed, setting out the alleged
violations of law by the Court.

No rehearing should be granted

for the reason that the opinion of 9 January 1979, if Defendants'
contentions are true, changed existing law to do substantial
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•
justice in light of the circumstances of this case.
The proposition that this Court can modify, create,
change existing common law to meet the requirements
is so well accepted as not to require citation.

Of ju:

In fact,

it may very well have been the Court's specific intent
to change the law, in view of the fact that no precedents.
cited in its opinion, and in view of the fact that STAUFf[
in their Appellants' Brief, previously before the court,
expressly invited the Court to change Utah law if it wen
found by the Court to be in favor of Defendants' position,
the interests of justice.
If the changes were made in existing law, then no err
on the part of the Court exists, and Defendants have no
ground for rehearing.
POINT X
THE DECISION OF 9 January 1979, IS PRESUMED
TO BE CORRECT, AND THEREFORE, NO REHEARING
SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHERE SUPPORTING BASES FOR
THE DECISION EXIST.
The opinion of 9 January 1979 cited no precedent, eit':
statutory or common law.

However, the acts of this Court

are presumed to be correct, and therefore must be viewed
in the light most favorable to STAUFFERS.

Doctrines which

provide support for the action of the court, among others,
may be as follows:

1.

The inherent equity powers of the Court.

2•

· h er
Estoppe 1 , eit

11

11
•
•
or "techn1'cal" which
in
pa1s

would estop Defendants from denying the existence of
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agreemen t as

to legal descriptions.

3.

The common law powers of the Court to change existing

4.

The power of the Court to review facts in matters of

law.

equity, to weigh the proof, and to overrule findings of lower
courts, which is has done in many previous instances.

s.

The power of the Court to adopt persuasive, foreign

common law as Utah law.
6.

The doctrine of "part performance" .

since any of the foregoing could have supported the
opinion of 9 January 1979, no error exists in the decision
rendered, and no rehearing should be allowed.
CONCLUSION
No rehearing should be granted for the reasons that
(1) Defendants have never filed a proper petition seeking
rehearing and therefore are not entitled to such relief;
(2) if Defendants' "Brief for Petition on Rehearing" is viewed
as a petition for rehearing, it contains improper argument
and reargurnent, and is not accompanied by a proper brief;
(3) Justice Ellett has retired;
taken;

(4)

no "judicial notice" was

(5) if "judicial notice" was taken, a hearing on the

same would have been a futile act, and Defendants could not
have shown that a great increase in the value of the land did
not occur following the making of the contract, the failure to
hold a hearing therefore being only harmless error, if any;
( 5) no "dishevelment" of the record occurred, and the Court
applied proper standards of review;

(7)

the doctrine of
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"part performance" was properly noted by the Court; (S)
the Court properly exercised its equitable powers; (g) ii
existing law had been in favor of Defendants, the Court
properly made new law;

(10)

the opinion of 9 January

1979

is supported amply by existing principles of law; and
( 11)

the equities are overwhelmingly in favor of STAUFFE'i

Therefore, the case should be immediately remanded to the.
court for execution of appropriate conveyances by Defendar.:
to STAUFFERS, and for other necessary proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

/~3th

day of March 1911

// /{fd~~fie__-£
/'~ // / ;{ I , /.
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WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for DAVID M. STAUFFER
and CONNIE A. STAUFFER
P.O. Box 279
172 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to MICHAEL D. HUGHES, of ALLEN, THOMPSON, and HUC
attorney for Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants,
to 148 E. Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, first class,
this _/~J_t_ti-_day of
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